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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
at the current term, in Massachusetts v. Missouri,' that juris-
diction will be taken only when it appears that the estate is in-
sufficient to satisfy all conflicting tax claims.
It is well to note that the prohibition of multiple taxation
has never been extended to the case of international conflicts.
Consequently, although there are due process clauses in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is held that the Federal
Estate Tax may reach foreign bonds kept here but owned by a
citizen of Great Britain domiciled in Cuba at his death" and also
that the Federal Income Tax may reach income of a United
States citizen domiciled in Mexico even though the income is ex-
clusively from Mexican land."
Largey MacDonald.
TAXABILITY OF PROPERTY OF MUTUAL
IRRIGATION COMPANY
The method of taxing the irrigation system of a mutual
irrigation corporation was worked out by an interesting appli-
cation of the principle allowing disregard of the corporate en-
tity in Brady Irrigation Company v. Teton County, et al.,' de-
cided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1938. Plaintiffs,
stockholders in the irrigation company, sought to restrain the
commissioners and treasurer of Teton County from securing
a tax deed to lands, reservoir, dams, ditches, canals, and other
like property of the irrigation company. The Court held that
the injunction should be granted, saying that the total value
of the property owned by the irrigation company represents
the aggregate value of the water rights of its shareholders; that
these rights when used by the shareholders become appurtenant
to their lands, adding to the taxable value of those lands; and
that in a case of a mutual irrigation company the Court would
look behind the corporate veil and avoid taxing these interests
twice.
That water rights are appurtenant to the land on which
they are used is well-settled. Being appurtenant, such rights
"307 U. S ...... 60 S. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 38 (1939). Cf. 26 VA. L. REV. 2.81
(1939).
"Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 457, 77 L. Ed. 844 (1935).
"Cook v. Tait, 265 IT. S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895 (1923).
'107 Mont. 330, 85 P. (2d) 350 (1938).
'Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 Pac. 571 (1888) ; Hale v. Jefferson
Co., 39 Mont. 137, 101 Pac. 973 (1919) ; Osness Livestock Co. v. War-
ren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P. (2d) 215 (1936); Pendola v. Ramm, 138
.Cal. 517, 71 Pac. 624 (1903) ; Whittlesley v. Porter, 82' Conn. 95, 72
Atl. 593 (1909). And see WIEr, WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN STATES
(3d ed., 1911), Sec. 551. This rule is aided in Montana by Sec. 6671,
R. C. M., 1935: "A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to
land when it is by right used with the land for its benefit."
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are not taxable separately from the land.! The recent case of
Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry' is suggestive, holding
that a negative easement, by which the use of certain property
was restricted, bore its proportionate burden of taxation by the
added value which it gave to the property in favor of which it
ran, and was not cut off by a tax deed of the servient tenement.!
Montana also has held' that water rights represented by
landowners' shares of stock in a mutual ditch company are ap-
purtenant to land, though stock certificates are personal prop-
erty, so that a purchaser at foreclosure sale took title to both
land and stock, even though the stock was not mentioned in
the deed. California has upheld this view,' and Utah has fol-
lowed it also.' The result of this view is that the certificate of
stock represents the water right; that is, it represents an in-
terest in the property of the water company. This conflicts
with the general rule of the law of corporations to the effect
that ownership of a share of stock is not ownership of the cor-
porate property.
The decision in the principal case follows logically from
the rules established by the above cases. If the share of stock
represents the water right itself and becomes appurtenant to
the land, it is reasonable to say that when the landowner is
taxed on his land he pays also on the corporate property of
the irrigation company.
Conceivably, the result of the principal case could be bol-
stered by the theory that a mutual irrigation company is but a
trustee for those it serves, who own the equitable title.' Since
under that theory it could be said that the equitable title hold-
ers had already paid the tax, it would be impossible to sustain
another tax on the trustee of the same property. However,
Montana had already rejected the theory that a mutual irriga-
tion company is but a trustee and had declared that the rela-
*Hale v. Jefferson Co., 8upra; Essex Co. v. City of Lawrence, 214
Mass. 79, 100 N. E. 1016 (1913); COOLEY ON TAXATION (4th ed., 1924),
See. 568.
'104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937).
'The case is commented upon in 51 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1937) and in 12
WASH. L. REV. 300 (1937).
'Yellowstone Valley Co. v. Assoc. Mortgage Investors, Inc., 88 Mont.
73, 290 Pac. 255 (1930), noted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 476 (1931).
'In re Thomas' Estate, 147 Cal. 236, 81 Pac. 539 (1905) and Woodstone
Marble and Tile Co. v. Dunsmore Canyon Water Co., 47 Cal. App. 72,
190 Pac. 213 (1920).
'In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748 (1924). And see
WIEL, Op. Cit., Sec. 1269. But see KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTS (2d ed., 1912), Sec. 1484.
'This theory is followed in Riverside Water Co. v. Sargent, 112 Cal.
230, 44 Pac. 560 (1896), Tenem Ditch Co. v. Thorpe, 1 Wash. 566,
20 Pac. 588 (1889), and Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigat-
ing Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 135 Pac. 981 (1913). And see KINNEY
op. cit., Sec. 1481, 1482.
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tion between the company and its stockholders is one of con-
tract only..
Even under the trust theory, to avoid taxing the company
it would be necessary to pierce the corporate veil, and it is on
this latter ground that the Montana court based its decision.
The Court cited the U. S. Supreme Court cases of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Lowe' and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn' in support
of the view that when the facts warrant it, there should be no
hesitation in looking behind the corporate veil in tax cases. The
Southern Pacific case held that where a corporation received
dividends from a second corporation all of whose capital stock
it owned, and the dividend was effectuated by a bookkeeping
process which simply reduced the apparent surplus of the con-
trolled company and reduced the apparent indebtedness of the
controlling company, no income tax should be levied on such
dividends. The same result on similar facts was reached in the
Gulf Oil Corp. case.
As these cases indicate, it is sometimes desirable that the
corporate entity be disregarded when it comes to determining
what and who should be taxed. Where the interest of the stock-
holder in the corporate property is so intimately associated with
other property owned as in the case of a mutual, non-profit
irrigation company, there is presented a proper case for appli-
cation of the principle. Even so, the result of the principal
case is startling in its refusal to hold any of the corporate prop-
erty taxable to the corporation, in view of Art. XII, Sec. 7, of
the Montana Constitution and Sec. 2013, R.C.M., 1935. Art.
XII, Sec. 7, provides that "* * * all corporations in this state or
doing business therein, shall be subject to taxation * * * on
real and personal property owned or used by them and not by
this constitution exempted from taxation." The only provision
of the Constitution under which property of this corporation
could be held exempt is the clause of Art. XII, See. 2, which
permits exemption of "such other property as may be used
exclusively for the agricultural and horticultural societies" and
there would seem to be no construction of this provision on
which it is possible to bise the idea that it includes the property
of a mutual irrigation company. And, in any event, the legis-
lature has not provided for the exemption. On the other hand,
it is difficult to exclude such property from the provisions of
Sec. 2013, which states that "the property of every firm and
corporation must be assessed in the county where the property is
situate, and must be assessed in the name of the firm or corpor-
ation." Of course, this section does not state that the property
must be taxed in the name of the corporation, but that would
'Dyk v. Buell Land Co., 70 Mont. 557, 227 Pac. 71 (1924).
n247 U. S. 330, 62 L. Ed. 1142, 37 S. Ct. 540 (1917).
"248 U. S. 71, 63 L. Ed. 133, 39 S. Ct. 35 (1918).
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seem to be the evident intention. The Court neither cited nor
discussed these constitutional and statutory provisions.
Bernard Thomas
PROPRIETY OF INSTRUCTION ON COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE
The decision in McCulloch v. Horton1 has given rise to the
question whether the doctrine of comparative negligence now
prevails in Montana. The Court approved denial of a requested
instruction on contributory negligence to the effect that plain-
tiff could not recover if he were guilty of "any negligence,
however slight, that proximately contributed" to his injury.'
In 114 A. L. R. 823, where the case is reprinted and anno-
tated, the author of the comment states at page 832 that the re-
quested instruction correctly expounds the law of contributory
negligence as limited by the doctrine of proximate cause, inas-
much as the expression "however slight" is qualified by the
phrase "that proximately contributed," but that the Court, in
rejecting that instruction, necessarily took the position that
slight negligence on the part of plaintiff, even though actually
contributing to his injury, would not bar recovery. This latter
position, said the writer, represents the doctrine of comparative
negligence, viz., the doctrine that plaintiff may recover if his
negligence is slight as compared with defendant's negligence.!
It is true that this instruction has been approved in a num-
ber of cases on the ground that a contrary ruling would amount
to adoption of the comparative negligence principle." Thus, in
'105 Mont. 531, 74 P. (2d) 1, 114 A. L. R. 823 (1937).
'The offered instruction read in full as follows: "Should you believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff was negligent, and that the de-
fendant was also negligent, you must not compare their negligence
and thereby make up your verdict against the party that may appear
to you from the evidence to have been the more negligent and in favor
of the party that may appear to have been guilty of the lesser degree
of negligence, because under the law of this State if a plaintiff was
guilty of any negligence, however slight, that proximately contributed
to the injuries he receives, he cannot recover by this action."
8"The two doctrines may be defined as follows: (1) Doctrine of com-
parative negligence.-Even though the plaintiff was negligent, and
even though his negligence concurrently with the defendant's negli-
gence proximately caused his Injury, he may recover, if the degree of
his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant. (2)
Doctrine of contributory negligence as limited by or in its relation to
the doctrine of proximate cause,--While the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, however slight, will defeat his right to recover, If It
was the proximate or the concurrent cause of his Injury, it will not
defeat that recovery if it merely remotely caused or contributed to
the injury." 114 A. L. R. at 831.
"Birmingham Ry. Light & P. Co. v. Bynum, 139 Ala. 389, 36 So. 736
(1903) ; Botti v. Savill, 97 Cal. App. 524, 275 Pac. 1029 (1929) ; Cream-
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